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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between employment relations and 
American corporate governance using the case of Ferodyn*. In response to 
difficult industry conditions and sagging performance, American-owned 
Landis* Steel Corporation and Japanese-owned Daiichi* Steel Corporation 
jointly financed and built Ferodyn, a state-of-the-art high quality steel finishing 
facility. Although the joint venture was extremely successful in terms of quality, 
productivity and industrial relations, it came under severe stress from both 
external and internal pressures. Ferodyn’s success was moderated by the market 
in that it was never able to extract a price premium for the quality of steel it 
produced. At the same time, pressures in the form of corporate governance and 
the parent / subsidiary relationship were substantial. Institutional investor 
demands for improvements in short run shareholder value ultimately resulted in 
the sale of Landis to Maxi-metal*, a global steel conglomerate, committed to  a 
strategy of minimising costs. In this case, the organ transplant provides a useful 
metaphor: Ferodyn was like a strong and healthy ‘organ transplant’ in a weak 
and ailing corporate ‘body.’ So long as there were buffers in place to protect it 
from rejection by its host, Ferodyn could prosper, giving rise to exceptionally 
high labour standards and quality of life for its employees. In effect, the 
American system of corporate governance and the nature of power relations in 
the corporation created antigens that weakened both Landis’s ability to support 
the joint venture and Ferodyn’s ability to survive in an alien and hostile 
corporate, industry and macro-economic environment.   
 
* Ferodyn, Landis, Daiichi and Maxi-metal are fictitious names. 
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Institutional Transplant and American Corporate Governance: 
the Case of Ferodyn 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium, privatisation, 
concentration and globalisation have generated rapid technological 
change and intensifying competition in both the public and private 
sectors. Customers have learned to exercise their ‘choice’ more 
aggressively and shareholders (both private and public) have become 
increasingly impatient for a quick and profitable return on their 
investments. In response to these pressures, firms have been forced to 
re-examine and improve their systems of corporate governance; while 
at the same time restructuring outdated organisational and production 
systems and structures. Alternative models of corporate governance are 
under hot debate (i.e. ‘stakeholder’ versus ‘shareholder’ systems); the 
contribution of work organisation to performance has been an important 
focus, and the notion ‘partnership’ has emerged as a popular approach 
to employment relations. 
 
This paper examines the relationship between employment relations 
and corporate governance in the Anglo-American context using the 
case of Ferodyn, a highly successful joint venture between American-
owned Landis Steel Corporation and Japanese-owned Daiichi Steel 
Corporation.1 In this case, steel of the highest quality in the world was 
produced using state-of-the-art technology and a participative system 
of work organisation and employment relations. However, it soon 
came under severe external and internal stresses, the responses to 
which have the potential to undermine the foundations for Ferodyn’s 
performance effectiveness. The question I want to address is whether 
or not it is possible to successfully ‘transplant’ a cooperative work 
system into a ‘hostile’ host environment, where market forces guide 
competitive relationships, historical legacy is one of managerial 
authority and control, and corporate governance forces managers to 
prioritise shareholder interests above all others.   
 
1. Governance of the Corporate Enterprise 
 
The American corporation is essentially an ‘empty legal shell,’ whose 
value is derived from the claims it has against its underlying 
economic entity, the firm.2 Primarily a financing device, the 
corporation’s distinctive features include limited liability, legal 
identity and perpetual existence.3 In exchange for an equity 
investment, corporate stock is issued to investors or ‘shareholders,’ 
who are entitled to what is left from the firm’s income stream after the 
contractual claims of employees, creditors and other stakeholders 
have been met.  Because shareholders are the last to receive anything 
in the event of insolvency, they assume the risk of failure; but they 
also gain in proportion to the company’s success. Although in a literal 
sense, shareholders do not own the company or its assets, their 
ownership of common voting stock provides certain ownership rights 
as residual claimants. In particular, shareholders can dispose of their 
shares in the stock market.   
 
Managers control the day-to-day decisions affecting firm behaviour 
and performance. Because of the potential for managers to have 
interests that conflict with the pursuit of maximizing short-term 
shareholder value, there is said to be a ‘separation of ownership and 
control’ (Berle and Means 1932).  This has given rise to laws 
governing relationships between ‘principals’ (shareholder / owners) 
and their ‘agents’ (managers).4  As a result, the stock market is often 
considered a ‘market for corporate control,’ in which rival 
management teams bid to persuade shareholders to sell them 
controlling interests by offering a premium over current share prices.  
 
In this context, corporate governance can be understood as the system 
governing a particular organizational form, the corporation. With 
respect to internal organisation and governance, company law is 
virtually silent; corporate governance within the firm is a matter for 
the company itself to decide. However, the legal system provides a 
mechanism for the negotiation and enforcement of contracts. It 
therefore has an impact on the model of corporate governance that 
 
might emerge and dominate in a particular national economic context. 
In the Anglo-American System, a tradition of private law, based 
around the enforcement of contracts, has given rise to a ‘Shareholder 
Model’ of corporate governance. In this model, shareholder interests 
are prioritised above all others, justified on the basis of three main 
arguments: (1) their investment is more valuable, (2) other 
stakeholders can protect their investments through contracts, (3) other 
stakeholders have other sources of power ex-post that protect their 
investments.5    
 
Considering corporate governance more generally, the work system 
can be viewed as embedded in a corporate governance system 
characterised by layers of governance, from the work system to the 
norms and rules that operate at a national or trans-national level  (See 
Figure 1).   
 
Starting at the micro-level, the level of the production system, layers 
of corporate governance include the explicit and implicit agreements 
embodied in the system of relations between labour and management 
and corporate culture. Moving outward, the corporate governance 
layers that form the external environment include the structure and 
nature of corporate share ownership; the national legal and economic 
framework within which productive activities are conducted; and the 
trans-national legal and economic framework. Each layer of 
governance forms a significant part of the environment in which the 
other levels operate. However, within the external and internal 
governance system, layers are not necessarily hierarchical; not only 
do they interact with each other, they may also interact with, moderate 
or magnify external market and regulatory pressures operating on the 
productive system. Given the nested nature of the corporate 
governance system, the prevailing rules of ownership and control 
affect the capacity of managers, acting as shareholders’ agents, to 
pursue various approaches in their relationship with labour.   
 
 
As evident in the discussion above, the relationship between work 
systems and corporate governance is complex and characterised by 
dynamic interaction and feedback effects.  Regulatory requirements 
and product market conditions, which are largely unavoidable, can 
interact with each other and with the system of corporate governance 
in ways that either support or constrain efforts to maintain partnership 
with employees. However, corporate governance is rarely a 
determining factor in itself; coupled with these other environmental 
factors, corporate governance has the potential to influence both the 
choice of strategy by parties to the employment relationship and their 
ability to achieve objectives across time.   
 
The work system can therefore not be meaningfully separated from its 
broader governance system and environment. The dominant system of 
corporate governance in combination with the firm’s market and 
regulatory framework have the potential to encourage or constrain 
more micro-level efforts by influencing the terms and conditions for, 
and the durability of partnership in employment relations.  Although 
not the only factor, corporate governance has an important influence 
on the ability of parties to develop and maintain partnership at various 
organisational levels. It also plays a role in allocating the resulting 
costs and benefits, and hence the returns to partnership. Therefore, the 
ability of management to honour commitments made in exchange for 
employees’ acceptance of the additional skill, effort and responsibility 
needed for effective partnership will depend upon the institutional and 
economic system within which these agreements are made and 
implemented. 
 
Competing models of corporate governance  
It is important to note that the Anglo-American ‘shareholder-
maximising’ theory of the firm emerged out of a particular historical 
context during the late 1800s, as finance capital became an important 
resource for exploiting mass markets (Phahalad 1993, Roe 1994, 
Smith and Dyer 1996, Calomiris and Ramirez 1996). It gradually 
gained force as shareholders acquired property rights enforced by 
contracts and limited liability doctrines; and managers were held 
 
accountable for using the firm’s resources to maximise shareholders’ 
interests. The rise of the shareholder model also coincided with the 
development of large scale manufacturing production as the major 
system for organising production. In this context, bureaucratic 
managerial systems were developed and scientific management came 
to dominate approaches to organizing work and production 
relationships. In this model, job structures were rigid and hierarchical 
and relationships between labour and management were adversarial.  
With the growth in industrial trade union representation, collective 
bargaining over rates of pay and terms of employment characterized 
the relationship between labour and management. 
  
In the 1980s, concern over competitiveness led to interest in German, 
Japanese, Italian and Swedish systems of corporate governance and 
production. This ‘new competition’ was broadly based on higher 
quality, improved design, greater variety, more rapid product and 
process innovation and lower costs (Best 1990). In these systems, 
employment relationships were cooperative and contracting 
relationships with suppliers and customers were relational; and 
corporate governance was much more stakeholder oriented (Wever 
1995, Aoki 1988).  
 
But the rise of hostile take-overs and pressures from institutional 
investors produced a counter-reaction that strengthened the power and 
centrality of shareholders, particularly in the American case. In the 
1980s, hostile takeovers came to be regarded as a mechanism both for 
raising shareholder value and enhancing the efficiency of the 
corporate system as a whole (Jensen 1989). Two main effects were 
attributed to hostile bids: Firstly, the threat of an unwelcome bid 
served to improve the performance of incumbent managers and to 
align their interests more completely with those of shareholders. 
Secondly, hostile bids, even where they were unsuccessful, tended to 
induce corporate restructurings which in turn freed up productive 
resources to be reallocated to more efficient uses elsewhere in the 
economy. In order to realize these ends, the fostering of an active 
market for corporate control was seen to be one of the principle goals 
 
for company law. Thus, it has been the threat of hostile takeover, 
particularly since the 1980s, that has focused such strong attention on 
shareholder interests. 
 
During the mid-1990s, concern over the long-term effects of corporate 
downsizing, outsourcing, stagnant real wages, increased income 
inequalities, the growth in contingent work, declining union 
representation and the breakdown in the implicit psychological or 
social contract in employment relations have generated interest in 
approaches that take into account the rights of other stakeholder 
groups (Kochan and Rubinstein 2000). At the same time, growing 
interest in the relationship between work organisation and productive 
system performance has encouraged re-consideration of the role of the 
work system and labour management relationships in this context. 
 
As a result, the shareholder model is effectively being challenged by a 
stakeholder model that views hostile takeovers as occasions for 
redistribution (rather than generation) of wealth. The gains made by 
shareholders are said to accrue not from greater efficiency in the 
management of assets but from income transfers made at the expense 
of the long-term employees, suppliers and customers of the firm. The 
threat of such expropriation undermines cooperation within the 
productive process and thereby threatens long-term competitiveness 
(and hence, long-term shareholder value). 
 
There is little disagreement regarding the benefits associated with co-
operation or ‘partnership’ in production. It allows for the full 
exploitation of the technical complementarities inherent to production 
and facilitates the sharing of knowledge necessary for the 
effectiveness of productive systems and their improvement.6 It also 
fuels the organisational learning processes by which new information 
and knowledge are created, incorporated and diffused, and by which 
new products, processes and organisational forms are developed.7 The 
resulting operational and dynamic efficiencies are crucial 
determinants of the ability of organisations to compete effectively, 
and to respond flexibly to changing circumstances and new 
 
opportunities. These efficiencies are also important because they 
generate the value added by the productive system, which forms the 
basis for the income and employment security of its various 
stakeholder groups. 
 
In the American industrial relations and management literature, most 
studies find that cooperative workplace techniques generate 
substantive productivity and quality gains for manufacturers 
implementing them (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Ichniowski, Kochan, 
Levine, Olson, and Straus 1996; lchniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 
1997; Black and Lynch 1998; Pfeffer 1998). Additionally, studies 
focusing explicitly on financial returns have found that new work 
systems generate results that are equal or superior to those associated 
with more traditional work systems (Huselid 1995, Baker 1999). 
 
Given empirical evidence of their relative efficiency, one would 
expect these new workplace techniques to quickly dominate in 
American firms. However, radical and sustained organizational 
transformation has been challenging in the U.S. economic and 
industrial environment. Even those firms that succeed in planning and 
implementing cooperative work systems have found that sustaining 
them over the longer term is difficult. To date, studies suggest that 
diffusion of these practices is slower and less extensive than one 
would expect, and the medium and long-run survival of even the most 
promising new workplace techniques is far from guaranteed 
(Osterman 1994; Pfeffer 1996; Doeringer, EvansKlock, and Terkla 
1998, Kochan and Rubinstein 2000). 
 
 
2. The Organ Transplant Metaphor:  The Case of Ferodyn 
 
To understand the relationship between cooperative employment 
relations and the American system of corporate governance – and the 
systemic challenges to implementing and maintaining a stakeholder-
oriented approach in this context -- the organ transplant serves as a 
useful metaphor. Since 1954, when the first successful organ 
 
transplant was performed in the United States, the most serious 
problem has been the likelihood that the transplant will be rejected or 
destroyed as part of the human body’s natural response to foreign 
invaders. Each person’s cells contain surface molecules, called major 
histocompatibility antigens (MHAs). When the immune system 
detects foreign MHA’s on a new, transplanted organ, it attempts to rid 
the body of (or ‘reject’) it. The discovery of new drugs that suppress 
the immune system have made transplantation from unrelated donors 
feasible by allowing doctors to manage the process of chronic 
rejection.8 However, it is a process that must be carefully monitored 
and managed for the life of the patient if both patient and transplant 
are to survive. 
 
Ailing Landis Steel and hope of a transplant from Daiichi Steel 
In 1982, when the American steel industry was in deep crisis, Landis 
Steel Corporation recorded its first economic losses in fifty years. 
Like many other US steel producers, its first response was to cut 
costs, reduce capacity, layoff people and delay capital expenditures. 
However, despite these efforts, Landis continued to suffer extreme 
financial difficulties. It was in this context that a new CEO took over 
and the company began to explore alternatives for corporate 
restructuring and for revitalizing productive operations. In 1984 and 
1985, Landis sold off its non-steel assets, laid off thousands of 
employees and redirected production to the higher profit, high quality 
carbon steel segments of the market. 
 
Ferodyn was born out of these corporate performance difficulties and 
the determination of its new CEO to turn the company around. During 
the early 1980s, Landis Steel Company announced plans to explore 
the possibility of constructing a cold-rolling steel processing facility. 
In 1983, Japanese-owned Daiichi Steel Corporation, was consulted.  
Daiichi had recently built a new continuous cold mill capable of 
producing steel coils of extraordinary dimensions, surface quality and 
drawability, at a speed matched by no other plant in the world; it 
produced in one hour what could be produced in no less than twelve 
days in existing American facilities. Landis decided to try to 
 
‘transplant’ this technology into its facility in the U.S. However, poor 
corporate performance in a context of industry crisis translated into 
insufficient internal funding sources and difficulties in obtaining 
domestic financing. The venture therefore depended on partnership 
with another company. 
 
In the spring of 1985, Landis approached Daiichi and proposed 
forming a joint venture using the Japanese technology employed in its 
continuous cold rolling facility in Japan. Initially not interested, by 
summer, Daiichi faced over-capacity in the Japanese domestic steel 
market and pressure from Japanese automobile transplants that were 
unable to obtain steel of requisite quality in the United States. 
Importing steel from Japan was both expensive and difficult; and it 
was exacerbating trade tensions between the two countries. Daiichi 
therefore became interested in a joint venture that would allow it to 
produce high quality steel in the United States, thereby avoiding trade 
restrictions and tensions. Because Daiichi had maintained a long, 
informal relationship with Landis, and respected Landis’s corporate 
commitment to the steel industry, it made sense for the two 
companies to collaborate.  
 
In the end, Daiichi agreed to arrange project financing that would not 
appear on Landis’s balance sheet, and to accept the joint venture 
facility as collateral for the debt. The bulk of the initial Ferodyn cost 
was provided by three Japanese trading companies. In 1987, the 
agreement to build Ferodyn was signed; and an agreement to build a 
second joint venture facility on the same site was signed in 1989.  The 
first mill was on-line by 1989 and the second was ready for 
production in 1991. Daiichi also became the largest shareholder of 
Landis, with a 13 percent stake in the firm.  
 
The ‘transplant’ operation 
The Ferodyn plant was built, literally in a cornfield, about 100 miles 
away from Landis’s main plant. During the implementation and 
development stages of operation, visionary corporate management 
and international union support were important in shaping the new 
 
company. Landis’s CEO and the president of the United Steelworkers 
of America (USWA) were avid supporters of the Ferodyn productive 
system. It also had the support of top plant management and local 
USWA union leadership.  
 
Although the core workforce was recruited from Landis’s main plant, 
Ferodyn’s local autonomy and its location away from the parent plant, 
provided opportunities to divorce itself from the traditional labour 
market system in steel and to pursue a radically different system in the 
new facility. Employees were carefully selected based on cooperative-
ness and capacity for working in groups, flexibility, motivation and 
trainability. They were then trained in both technical and social skills 
for a year prior to start-up, part of which included training in Japan to 
gain experience and insight into the effective operation of a plant like 
Ferodyn.  
 
The Ferodyn work system was designed to reflect the requirements of 
its technology.  Shared responsibility, broadly defined jobs and few 
job classifications characterised the organisation of work.  Self-
directed autonomous teams were assigned control over the entire 
production process, with authority to make on-the-line decisions 
regarding production, product quality and purchasing. Instead of 
supervisors, engineers and other management resources were 
available as needed. However, during the second and third shifts each 
day and on weekends (16 out of the 21 shifts per week), there were no 
managerial or white collar personnel in the plant. Information about 
team and plant performance was shared and major plant- and 
production-related decisions were made by consensus, from the shop 
floor teams to the Joint Advisory Council (JAC).  At all levels, 
bargaining unit and managerial employees were expected to offer 
ideas and suggestions, which carried equal weight in joint decision-
making.  By providing vehicles for self-expression and involvement 
in a wide range of business interests, the Ferodyn work system 
featured an open system of internal communication and an effective 
process of problem and conflict resolution. 
 
 
On a regular basis, employees received work related technical 
training; training in math, chemistry and computer programming; and 
training in social skills including teamwork, team building and 
communication skills. Such broad and extensive training in technical 
and computer skills, coupled with training in business and social skills 
equipped workers with the knowledge necessary for assuming 
responsibility beyond the technical requirements of their jobs.  It also 
provided transferable skills and expertise marketable in the external 
labour market, lowering the personal risk associated with investment 
in the new work system, thereby improving the likelihood of 
cooperative and flexible job behaviour. 
 
Because the production process is entirely computer controlled, 
employees are particularly important in monitoring and managing the 
production process, especially in the event that problems arise.  
According to Ferodyn’s plant president, ‘the technology provides for 
the operation to run absolutely wonderfully’ with operators and 
maintenance personnel working ‘proactively together to avoid 
problems.’  But when something goes wrong, ‘teamwork, training and 
employee authority to make decisions on the line are critical.’  Work 
is organised into three basic areas:  production, craft/maintenance and 
entry.  Within this structure, promotion ladders are flat and based on 
training, knowledge and skill.  Each employee is expected to advance 
to fully qualified status, serving to reduce class distinctions and 
barriers by permitting and encouraging all employees to reach their 
maximum potential. Workers are cross-trained, multi-skilled, multi-
craft workers.  Although assigned a skill-based classification, 
operators normally perform preventive maintenance on equipment 
they operate; and craft maintenance workers run the equipment they 
maintain.   
 
To promote employee commitment to Ferodyn’s high performance 
work system and its objectives, bargaining unit employees are 
guaranteed employment security, with a bonus system based on team 
performance. In this context, the Ferodyn compensation system 
served as another important support mechanism for the work system.  
 
Designed to reward delivery of consistent and exceptionally high 
quality and efficiency, the compensation system was a pay for 
knowledge system where workers’ pay reflected their skill 
classification level, with quarterly bonuses that were equally shared, 
regardless of position. According to Ferodyn’s plant president, ‘If you 
are going to tell them they’re responsible for quality, then you’d better 
pay them for good quality and not pay them for tons of any quality.’ 
All workers were guaranteed a 40-hour week generating relatively 
high annual incomes by local and industry standards; and within the 
first two years of operation, the bonus system was delivering roughly 
a quarter of employees’ total compensation. 
 
Labour relations at Ferodyn were amicable and characterized by a 
high degree of trust and mutual respect, based on learning through 
experience that parties could be depended on to keep their promises 
and commitments.  However, good labour relations did not 
automatically materialise.  Both labour and management had to learn 
how to relate to each other differently because the core workforce 
came from the traditional labour relations environment of Landis’s 
main plant.  The learning process involved training and was 
reinforced by experience in the joint implementation of the Ferodyn 
work system – from the development of its mission statement and 
statement of values through weathering the challenges of the learning 
curve process following start-up.  In this, the behaviour of various 
actors and their implicit and explicit commitment to each other and 
the venture provided a foundation for solving future problems.  
Employment security clauses helped to bolster these commitments. 
 
Both managerial and bargaining unit employees went through stages 
where their commitment to stated intentions and plans was tested. For 
example, the Japanese had originally lobbied for turn foremen but 
were turned down by the American JAC, who agreed to station 
engineers on the floor but only as a ‘resource.’ During the early 
phases of operation, workers were allowed to learn and to make 
mistakes.  According to Ferodyn’s plant president, ‘ At that time, we 
had a number of strip breaks in the furnace that were very costly … 
 
but gradually people learned how to react.  It just took time.’  This 
kind of common sense and faith, both in and between Ferodyn 
management and bargaining unit employees was pivotal in creating a 
high trust, functional work culture. 
 
In this context, plant level employees bought-into the system and it 
thrived as evident in the high level of employee persistence. Quits and 
/ or layoffs were virtually nonexistent; and during the first eight years 
of operation, only five to ten people from labour and management left 
voluntarily.  This is despite shifting pressures from Landis Steel 
Company with changes in its CEO, company president and 
management philosophy during the 1990s. According to a top 
managerial representative at Ferodyn, the changes in management 
were the greatest stresses operating on the subsidiary because “it 
pulled us in all different directions.”  
 
Suppressing the immune system: Buffers from internal and 
external stresses   
One of the primary strategic approaches taken by Ferodyn decision-
makers was to direct the focus of productive agents on particular jobs 
and to assign them the authority and autonomy to accomplish their 
required tasks without distraction. For production employees, the 
objective was to produce high quality flat rolled steel efficiently; it 
was not to worry about how Landis’s stock price was doing, or how 
its employees at the main plant felt about the Ferodyn venture. 
According to local management and union representatives, the “willy 
nilly of the world” in many instances was a distraction for production 
employees; and it was management’s responsibility to insulate 
employees from unimportant “noise.” Therefore, while management 
gave employees significant autonomy over production and work 
system decisions, there was explicit acknowledgment by all parties 
involved that managing Ferodyn’s external environment by top-level 
plant managers was critical to making employees effective at the 
production level. 
  
 
Under the leadership of its first plant president, the Ferodyn system 
worked effectively. This was in part due to its managerial structure 
with direct internal lines of authority to the plant president and then to 
the corporate Chief Operating Officer. The Human Resources (HR) 
Manager, for example, reported directly to the plant president, who 
himself was an officer of Landis Steel Company, reporting directly to 
the president of Landis. As a result, Ferodyn's interests were 
represented directly to top corporate leadership. This served to protect 
the core operating system from pressures generated by the possible 
divergence of interests between Ferodyn and Landis’s main plant that 
might subordinate Ferodyn's interests to those of the steel company as 
a whole.   
 
The Ferodyn operating system was also insulated from external 
pressures by a supply agreement with Landis stipulating that steel 
supplied to Ferodyn would be sourced from Landis’s main plant. 
Operating funds were provided by Landis based on the Landis Daiichi 
Steel Partnership Agreement. During the start-up phases of operation, 
when bugs were worked out of the system, mistakes were made and 
learning took place, these financial arrangements protected the new 
facility from competitive market pressures. They also protected the 
facility in the event of catastrophic breakdown of equipment or any 
other such unforeseen event that might impact costs. Through time, as 
Ferodyn broke world records for efficiency and quality, doubts about 
its profitability were dispelled. Still, the financial arrangement with 
Landis was an important buffer against external market pressures 
during the period of time when the new work system was most 
vulnerable. 
 
The joint venture with Daiichi Steel Corporation was another buffer 
against external pressures, particularly those relating to short-term 
costs. Daiichi’s objective in the venture has traditionally been oriented 
towards assuring the production of consistently high quality steel at 
high volume. This is because the specifics of the financing 
arrangement are such that Daiichi earns a return on its investment 
based on operating hours of the major production units, not cost 
 
cutting. This arrangement has at times put the two partners at odds 
with each other, because Landis’s profits from the joint venture are 
more closely linked to operating profit than are Daiichi’s. 
Additionally, and partly because bonus payments to bargaining unit 
members are largely based on quality and volume, Daiichi and the 
union more often than not find themselves on similar sides of 
particular issues.    
   
Evidence of a successful operation 
After reaching steady state operating levels, the Ferodyn productive 
system was highly effective. It set world records for efficiency and 
product quality. Employee performance bonuses were high, averaging 
approximately $4,000 (£2,815) per quarter ($16,000 (£11,260) per 
year). The Ferodyn work system was also exemplary, attracting the 
attention of more than one team of researchers who identified it as a 
surprisingly creative work system.  Employee turnover and grievances 
were virtually non-existent and Ferodyn employees overwhelmingly 
agreed that it was a good place to work.  According to one bargaining 
unit employee, “It felt like a career, not a job. For me, it was always 
what I thought work should be.” Similarly, a top Ferodyn manager 
said, “It was exciting to have the opportunity to take this ride of a 
lifetime where our instructions were to go out there and run this 
company.” 
  
Early signs of rejection 
Landis’s main plant has always been a dominant influence in 
Ferodyn’s external environment; and a consistent theme in the 
relationship has revolved around costs. When Landis’s profits sag, for 
example, pressure mounts to cut measurable costs wherever in the 
corporation they can be found -- not only at the main plant but also at 
Ferodyn. Pressures relating to costs began during start-up, when 
Landis faced financial difficulties and the Ferodyn facility was 
expensive. As a result, there was a lot of criticism directed at the 
venture, with the bargaining unit and first level management 
employees at Landis’s main plant assigning blame to Ferodyn for 
Landis’s performance problems. This put Ferodyn’s plant president 
 
and Chief Financial Officer as well as other Ferodyn executives and 
managers in the position of having to resolutely defend the plants and 
soften negativity from Landis’s main plant in order to prevent 
demoralisation of Ferodyn employees. In this, Ferodyn’s plant 
president’s position as an officer of Landis reporting directly to the 
corporation’s president gave him added clout, allowing Ferodyn 
employees to feel relatively confident that their interests were being 
represented and supported.  
 
As ‘antigens’ multiply, Ferodyn’s resistance diminishes 
Despite early successes and Ferodyn’s obvious profitability, intense 
competition from global low cost producers and pressure from 
customers to sell high quality steel at a competitive price, prevented 
Ferodyn from extracting a premium for its high quality products. 
According to the local union president, “when we started, our product 
was going to be so much better than the competition that it would 
command a premium. But that never happened. Market pressures 
never allowed us to extract the expected premium.” Thus, since 
Ferodyn operated in an industry populated by low road competition; 
and it was a supplier firm to customers who, too, were under pressure 
to compete on the basis of cost and price, it was vulnerable to pressure 
from low road firms in both its own and its customers’ markets. At 
the same time, since Ferodyn was a subsidiary of Landis Steel 
Company, it was subject to decisions made at the corporate level that 
may or may not have been in the best interest of the plant.  
 
The Ferodyn work system was also vulnerable to the impact of 
decisions made by Landis Steel Company that would affect its 
ownership structure and management. Although profitable, and one of 
the largest American steel producers, Landis was a relatively small 
player in an increasingly global marketplace. On top of this, global 
market pressures steadily pushed steel prices down, giving rise to 
widely publicized complaints of dumping. As a result, despite its 
relative efficiency and the fact that it had recorded profits for four 
straight years, steel stock prices in general (and Landis’s in particular) 
were accorded a low valuation by Wall Street. This was a continual 
 
frustration to Landis’s top managers, many of whom were terminated 
during the 1990s for failure to generate share value appreciation.   
 
Failure to train new managers in the technical and social requirements 
of the work system served to slowly but steadily erode the Ferodyn 
work culture. Although the initial employee base at Ferodyn 
(management and labour) received such training, in-coming managers 
did not. As a result, they had difficulty identifying with the Ferodyn 
work culture and they lacked the desire to make it succeed. During 
this same period, there were also important changes in high level 
corporate and plant management and union leadership. When 
Landis’s CEO retired in the mid 1990s, he was replaced by a much 
more financially oriented individual. In 1994, the president of the 
international USWA also retired and was replaced by a much more 
traditionally minded union leader. This was a blow to Ferodyn’s local 
union which had come to depend on strong support from the 
international USWA as they forged a more cooperative relationship 
with the company in the face of persistent tensions between with the 
USWA local at Landis’s main plant. In 1998, Ferodyn’s President 
retired. Whereas this individual had been an executive of Landis with 
a direct reporting relationship to Landis’s president, his replacement 
reported to an executive at Landis. These retirements and 
accompanying shifts in managerial and union personnel left the plant 
without strong leadership, protection and support, making it 
vulnerable to opposing managerial paradigms and an unsympathetic 
union position regarding the type of work system it embodied.   
 
Maxi-metal enters the scene and Ferodyn’s resistance deteriorates 
further 
By the late 1990s, under pressure from a group of institutional 
investors, Landis’s board decided it needed “to find a buyer” as 
pressures from shareholders to boost share prices by selling to a larger 
global player grew more intense.  In 1998, in a quickly negotiated 
buyout, Maxi-metal International, a global steel conglomerate, took 
advantage of the structural weakness in steel stock values and 
Landis’s anxiousness to improve them. It purchased Landis (and 
 
Landis’s share in Ferodyn), which by now was a restructured and 
efficient integrated steel company. The buy-out came as a surprise to 
many of the firm’s stakeholders, including Daiichi Steel and 
employees at Ferodyn.   
 
Under Maxi-metal’s control, ownership and management objectives 
were primarily focused on cost cutting and short term performance 
metrics. Maxi-metal’s first action following the take-over was to 
reduce managerial employment by almost 20 percent in Landis Steel 
Company, which included a reduction of one third at Ferodyn. It 
restructured lines of authority such that control is now centralized in 
Maxi-metal USA. All managerial personnel associated with the 
creation and implementation of Ferodyn were terminated, some quite 
abruptly; and many Ferodyn employee rights and responsibilities 
relating to production were removed (for example, Ferodyn 
bargaining unit employees no longer choose and order from vendors). 
Regular training has ceased; scheduled maintenance has been 
suspended and the flow of information has stopped. 
 
Under these conditions, Ferodyn’s ability to perform effectively is 
uncertain.  According to the local union president (about a year after 
the buyout), “I’m worried about Maxi-metal’s approach and our 
current customer base. The long-term question is whether we will be 
able to maintain the type of customer base we were built to have. 
They have the highest quality standards in the industry.” He likened 
Ferodyn’s situation to that of a car whose hood is welded shut. “If it is 
a well-built car, it can go a good long time before the engine blows 
out. But the question is when, not if, that will happen.” At that time, 
there was already evidence of deteriorating quality.   
 
Internal resentments were also increasing because in the face of 
intensifying financial difficulties and market pressures, parties 
assumed defensive positions. In this context, the union’s employment 
security generated considerable resentment on the part of salaried 
personnel who had no comparable protection. In this context, Ferodyn 
 
managerial and bargaining unit employees were increasingly fearful 
of the next stage in the process.  
 
Employee morale among bargaining unit employees also deteriorated, 
as evident in a sharp drop in employee suggestions for process and 
product improvements and innovation. According to the local union 
president, absenteeism became a serious problem. “In the old system, 
this was an empowering place to work. You were glad to be here and 
to work hard. Now, people are feeling burned out, tired, over-worked 
and emotionally drained.” There has also been a dramatic increase in 
the rate of grievances. According to the local union president, whereas 
fewer than five grievances were filed during Ferodyn's first 6 years of 
operation, more than 30 were filed in the two years following the 
buyout. Almost all related to grievances over unilateral change. 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
The transplantation metaphor is useful for understanding the case of 
Ferodyn, where in an effort to save Landis Steel Company from 
market failure, partnership in employment relations was incorporated 
into a stakeholder model of corporate governance in a greenfield site.9 
During the short to medium term (the first ten years), it proved to be 
highly successful despite severe pressure from the traditional 
American system of industrial relations (based on managerial control) 
and corporate governance (prioritising shareholder interests above all 
others). This success was only made possible by careful management 
of those pressures in a way that protected the new facility and allowed 
it to thrive. Over time, however, stresses increased but buffers were 
weakened as both Landis and Ferodyn struggled for survival in an 
increasingly hostile competitive and corporate environment. This is 
now putting the Ferodyn work system under considerable strain, 
threatening rejection and eroding the high labour standards and 
quality of life it has supported.   
 
 
The hostility of the Anglo-American environment to a transplanted 
cooperative work system can be traced to the structuring of this 
environment by historical developments in the theory and practice of 
markets and business.10 These are rooted in the liberal 
conceptualisation of individuals as inherently self-interested, and the 
assumption that behaviour is best mediated by the market in order to 
ensure both individual and general economic welfare. The 
significance of market competition is that it liberates the creative self-
interest of individuals while at the same time constraining its misuse. 
The market also rewards success by selecting out organisations by 
dint of their success and allowing them to grow to market dominance. 
Such arguments characterise the development of economic theory and 
legislative and legal practice which subsequently shifted the right to 
self-determination from individuals to the management of large 
corporations. This move was warranted by what Berk (1997) 
described as ‘corporate liberalism’, from which perspective 
managerial control of large firms is justified by the beneficial effect it 
is believed to have on economic progress. It is reinforced in 
employment relations, where managerial prerogative is considered the 
necessary means for enforcing workers’ compliance with contractual 
promise.  
 
In a parallel development, theories of labour management diverge 
from the idea of the efficacy of hierarchical control. The first stage in 
this process was the emergence of scientific management, by which 
scientific laws of production -- if properly applied by management – 
were believed to both maximise productive efficiency and resolve the 
mutual antagonism between managers and workers. Scientific 
management’s failure in this latter respect gave rise to the human 
relations school. Initially concerned with identifying the physiological 
and social needs of workers and using this knowledge to improve the 
performance of Taylorist forms of work organisation, further 
development in human relations led to the realisation that involving 
workers in the planning and execution of work as part of group 
activity improved their socio-psychological well-being and released 
their creativity. The idea that human relations is a productive factor 
 
was incorporated into what came to be described as human resource 
management (HRM). Thus, in the evolution of theory and practice in 
labour management, the role of management has been redefined from 
authoritarian initiator, organiser and director of work to democratic 
‘facilitator’ of a participatory, cooperative and self-regulating system; 
at the same time, workers have been re-conceptualised as full partners 
in co-operative production, rather than factors of production to be 
coerced into compliance with managerial interpretation of their 
contractual commitment. This progression in the roles of management 
and workers has been accompanied by a re-characterisation of the 
workplace from ‘pluralistic’ (where interests of the two sides are 
viewed as separate and potentially conflictual) to ‘unitary’ (where 
interests are considered to be in common). 
 
Theoretical developments in liberal economics and production 
management therefore diverge in their conclusions regarding 
authority and power in productive enterprise. Liberal economics 
justifies the increasing centralisation of entrepreneurial power and 
authority on the grounds that it is justified by market success; and 
challenging it risks slowing economic progress. Management theory, 
on the other hand, while not challenging the authority of management, 
argues for an increasing decentralisation of responsibility for 
production. This gives rise to a fundamental conflict between the 
logic of markets as an efficient mechanism for allocating resources, 
promoting entrepreneurship and distributing income (as 
conceptualised by liberal economic theory) and the logic of 
production management as a process for effectively combining and 
exploiting productive forces (as conceptualised by human resource 
management). This contradiction has been assumed away by 
supposition that the market is an efficient co-ordinating mechanism 
(ruling out the need for human agency) and by the idea that 
management, properly advised by the scientific laws of production 
and socio-psychological laws of human behaviour, can even-handedly 
work in the interest all the organisation's stakeholders.  
 
 
However, the contradiction between the laws of the market and the 
laws of production becomes more apparent when it is recognised that 
although stakeholders have interests in common, they also have 
interests that are different. More specifically, stakeholders have joint 
interests in the surplus that is created by the productive system but 
conflicting interests in how it is distributed. These differences are 
downplayed in liberal economic theory by the assumption that market 
forces secure an efficient distribution of income; they are also 
minimised in labour management theory by the supposition that 
workers respond positively when their social and psychological needs 
are met. Different prospects become apparent, however, when it is 
recognised that workers are neither wholly economic (relentlessly 
pursuing their own interest), nor wholly social (satisfied if their socio-
psychological needs are met). Rather, they have a complex set of 
social, psychological and economic needs and are reflexive in 
attempting to satisfy them (Sabel 1992). This also applies to the role 
of human resource management, in which context the effective 
reconciliation of different stakeholder interests is necessary to ensure 
that those involved in production work effectively together in order 
that the inherent co-operativeness of production is fully exploited.  
 
Workers’ response, in terms of their willingness to cooperate in 
production, can be positive or negative, depending upon perceptions 
regarding fairness of the terms and conditions of employment as well 
as treatment by their employers. There are two stages in determining 
fairness in employment: (1) the formal contract (which lays out the 
explicit terms and conditions); and (2) more implicit commitments 
(which go beyond the formal contract and determine the productive 
effectiveness of the employment relationship). While these less 
formal terms have often been described as the psychological contract, 
they could perhaps be better described as the human relations 
contract, capturing the commitments made by workers and their 
employers to work effectively together.  
 
 
The successful operation of the human relations contract requires 
workers to be fully committed to their employers’ business in 
exchange for fair pay, job and income security and a good working 
environment. A breach of this contract risks inciting a retaliatory 
withdrawal from full cooperation with an adverse effect on 
productivity and competitive performance. Effective cooperation 
therefore depends on agreement on both the explicit and implicit 
terms of the employment relationship, together with the expectation 
by both sides that commitments made will be honoured. But, the 
ability to identify and to act on the interests of individual stakeholders 
is to a large extent determined by the pressure managers are under to 
prioritise particular interests. In the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system, managers are required to prioritise shareholder 
interests, which are likely to diverge sharply from those of other 
stakeholders if shareholders insist on short-term gains. The problem 
of satisfying particular demands also increases with organisational 
complexity. In single plant firms, for example, managers and workers 
share mutual interests in the plant’s effective performance and long-
term economic viability, from which their own economic and 
employment security is derived. This is in contrast to large multi-
division, multi-plant firms, which create widening opportunities for 
conflicting interests across divisions and plants within the corporate 
body as a whole (Konzelmann Smith 1995, 1996) 
 
In a complex economic system, therefore, the ability to honour 
commitments and maintain trust is not entirely in the hands of those 
making commitments. As a result, it is necessary to consider the 
environmental conditions in which relationships are formed and 
conducted. It is here that the transplant metaphor offers insight. In 
cases like Ferodyn where a cooperative work system is transplanted 
into the Anglo-American productive system, difficulties are rooted in 
the inherent conflict between the market orientation of the host 
productive system and the human relations orientation of the 
transplanted work system. At every level, from the internal (i.e., 
industrial relations system and corporate culture) to the external (i.e., 
laws governing stock markets, national and trans-national legal and 
 
economic frameworks) governance system, the Anglo-American 
system is set up to reject a work system that depends upon a human 
resource orientation.  
 
Within the corporation, the nature of power relations and the tendency 
towards centralisation of power in the hands of top management make 
it difficult for a subsidiary to operate as an autonomous and 
independent entity from its corporate parent. As a result, it is 
vulnerable to decisions taken in the interest of the corporation that 
may not be in the interest of the subsidiary. The subsidiary/parent 
relationship brings with it other problems. For example, while costs 
are easily measured, it is difficult to assess a subsidiary’s contribution 
to corporate performance or share value. Further, because of 
differences in work environment and conditions across plants within 
the corporate enterprise, tensions are bound to mount on the sides of 
both managerial and bargaining unit personnel who perceive these 
differences as unfair, unjustified or to blame for other corporate 
difficulties. Another problem relates to differences in the assessment 
of profitability across joint venture partners. In the case of Ferodyn, 
Landis’s focus on cost and Daiichi’s focus on quality gave rise to the 
potential for conflicts of interest across the two parent companies. 
While Daiichi’s concern regarding maintenance of high quality 
production lent considerable support to Ferodyn, when Daiichi 
suffered economic pressures associated with Japan’s prolonged 
economic downturn, this support was substantially weakened. 
 
At a macro-level, the market orientation of the Anglo-American 
economic system means that unavoidable market uncertainty is 
difficult for a firm (or subsidiary) to mediate. In the case of steel, this 
has caused tremendous problems for traditional American steel 
producers in the face of increased competition from global companies 
like Maxi-metal that operate with a completely different set of cost 
and performance metrics. In this context, the priority assigned to 
shareholder interests over all others -- and the unrelenting pursuit of 
short-term shareholder value -- provide incentives for managers to 
 
adopt approaches (such as cost cutting and layoffs) that potentially 
undermine long term productive system viability.   
 
The ‘transplant’ metaphor thus offers insight into the systemic failure 
of cooperative, stakeholder systems in the Anglo-American corporate 
and corporate governance environment. Power relations and 
managerial authority in the corporation’s internal system of corporate 
governance; an historical legacy of adversarial union management 
relations; shareholder dominance in stock markets; a legal system that 
prioritises the interests of capital over labour; and unrestrained 
competition in global product markets combine as powerful antigens. 
Together, they serve to weaken both the corporation’s ability to 
protect a new subsidiary transplant and the subsidiary’s ability to 
survive mounting pressures and attacks designed to destroy it. In this 
very difficult environment, without the commitment of all involved 
coupled with continuous monitoring and careful management of the 
system’s natural tendency to reject or destroy an alien ‘transplant,’ 
neither the transplant nor the corporate body is likely to survive.  
 
 
Epilogue:  Hope of a ‘re-transplant’? 
 
There is some speculation that Daiichi Steel has an interest in buying 
Ferodyn from Maxi-metal. This would offer hope in the sense that 
Ferodyn would be ‘re-transplanted’ into a more ‘genetically 
compatible,’ less hostile and more supportive corporate body. The 
question would be whether the attacks Ferodyn has already sustained 
in the rejection process have been fatal. 
 
Notes
 
 
1 The case study information and quotations referenced in this paper 
are based on in-depth interviews with top management and union 
representatives at Ferodyn as well as interviews with middle 
managers and bargaining unit employees between 1990 and 2001. 
 
2 The firm has been variously defined, as a nexus of contracts 
(Alchian & Demsetz 1972); a collection of physical assets that are 
jointly owned (Grossman & Hart 1986); and more recently as a nexus 
of specific investments: a combination of mutually specified assets 
and people (Rajan and Zingales 1997, 1998) 
 
3 Limited liability means that those who contribute equity capital risk 
no more than their initial investments.  Legal identity and perpetual 
existence mean that the corporation lasts until dissolved and has a 
name in which it may transact business and be sued (Easterbrook and 
Fischel 1991). 
 
4 In contrast to the Principal-Agent Model, in the Continental 
European and Japanese contexts, the corporation is viewed as an 
institution with personality, character and aspirations of its own.  It is 
perceived to be a social institution with public responsibilities and a 
public interest in how it is run and governed.  Corporate objectives 
encompass the interests of a wide range of stakeholder groups 
(investors, employees, suppliers, customers and managers); however, 
the corporation also has a life independent of its stakeholders.  It is 
interesting, but perhaps not surprising, to note that the separation of 
ownership and control is less marked in these contexts, where 
supporting institutions are the product of the each country’s view of 
the corporation and its role in society. 
 
5 In Continental Europe and Japan, there is a tradition of 
administrative law where behaviour is regulated by public codes.  
This gives rise to a ‘Stakeholder Model’ of corporate governance, 
where the interests of different stakeholder groups are taken into 
 
 
account.  Thus, the objectives of corporate governance vary, 
depending on the dominant model.  In the Anglo-American agency 
model of corporate governance posits the maximization of 
shareholder value as its goal.  By contrast, managers in Continental 
Europe and Japan are inclined to view the development of the 
company as an end in itself; hence, they are charged with sustaining 
the interests of all stakeholder groups without giving priority to any 
particular group (Kay and Silbertson 1995). 
 
6 For a discussion of the concept of productive systems see Wilkinson 
(2002, 1998 and 1983), Tarling and Wilkinson (1987), Konzelmann 
Smith (1996), Birecree and Konzelmann (1997) and Birecree, 
Konzelmann and Wilkinson (1997), Konzelmann and Forrant (2002). 
 
7 O’Sullivan 1998; Lazonick 1991.   
 
8 More than half of transplanted kidneys (the organ most often 
transplanted) are rejected within 10 years.  There are several forms of 
rejection:  hyperacute rejection occurs in the operating room or within 
a few hours after surgery; acute rejection occurs 4 days to 6 months 
after surgery.  Chronic rejection develops slowly and is the most 
common form.  Its cause is unknown but most cases have been linked 
to improper management of medications designed to suppress the 
immune system and prevent rejection. 
 
9 A ‘greenfield’ site is a new facility at a new location.  This contrasts 
with a ‘brownfield’ site where a new facility is built at an existing, 
older plant location. 
 
10 The ideas embodied in this section are further elaborated in an 
extremely valuable work by Wilkinson 2002a, 2002b. 
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